


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POLITICAL TRENDS IN EUROPE REFLECT EAST-WEST SPLIT

WHILE local and national elections in Western European countries—France, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Britain—have revealed a swing toward a middle-of-the-road course, Eastern European governments are accelerating the consolidation of the extreme Left through exclusion or outright suppression of opposition parties. There is little doubt that the immediate impetus for this acceleration was given by the announcement in Poland on October 5 of the formation of the Communist Information Bureau. This announcement, in turn, was apparently precipitated by realization in Moscow and among Communist leaders of Eastern Europe that the tide of Communist influence was beginning to recede, and by fear that the reverse movement might eventually affect nations east of Berlin. The contemporary historian finds it difficult to determine which is cause and which is effect: whether, if the trend in Western Europe had continued to favor leftism, the Communists in the East might have been more slow to impose their ideas and practices on other parties; or whether, on the contrary, they might have seized upon Leftist successes in the West to speed the triumph of communism in the East. Two things, however, are clear: political developments within every nation have immediate outside repercussions; and there is no such thing today as "local" elections.

COMMUNIST CONSOLIDATION IN EAST. The departure from Poland of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Polish Peasant party (P.S.L.), who arrived in London on November 3, has enabled the Polish Communists to form the united Leftist front they had been seeking to achieve since the war. In the national elections of January 19, 1947 which, in the opinion of non-Polish observers, did not constitute the "free and unfettered" elections the Polish government had pledged itself to hold

under the Potsdam agreements,* the Peasant party polled 1,500,000 votes as compared with 11,000,000 votes claimed by the government bloc that included Communists and Socialists. The position of Mr. Mikolajczyk, faced by increasing restrictions against his party, was rendered still more difficult by attacks from his party's left-wing group headed by Czeslaw Wycech, former Minister of Education, who favored cooperation with the government bloc. Following Mikolajczyk's departure, Wycech on October 28 summoned the supreme council of the Peasant party for November 30 to undertake complete reorganization of the party. Meanwhile, Socialist Premier Joseph Cyrankiewicz warned the Catholic Church on October 29 that the government would not tolerate its use of religious freedom for political purposes. Ninety per cent of Poland's population is Catholic, and the Church continues to exercise great influence, especially in the field of education. Both Mikolajczyk and the Catholic Church have been accused by the Leftist press of being under the influence of the Western powers.

In Rumania Juliu Maniu, veteran leader of the National Peasant party, and some of his aides, have been on trial before a military tribunal on charges of conspiring with representatives of the Western powers. On October 25 the government of Prime Minister Groza announced a new and uncompromising purge of all elements, including those now in the coalition cabinet, who cannot accept unconditionally "the new social order we are preparing for this country." In Czechoslovakia, where the Communists in the 1946 national elections won 40 per cent of the votes—the largest percentage achieved by Communists in any country of Europe outside

*"Poland's Economy Revives Despite Political Conflicts," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 31, 1947.

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Russia—the Communist press has been attacking both the Czech Socialists, accused of being unduly favorable to the West, and the Slovak Democrats, charged with being under the influence of Fascist elements which, in the days of Nazi occupation, formed the pro-Hitler Tiso regime. On October 31 it was announced that the Slovak semi-autonomous administration, composed of eight Slovak Democrats and four Communists, had resigned at the demand of the Partisan front organization and the Slovak section of the Confederation of Labor, both Communist-dominated. The next day, however, the Slovak Democrats, who in Slovakia had won a majority in the 1946 elections, declared that they had not resigned, and that their resignation had been engineered during their absence by Dr. Gustav Husak, Communist Premier of the Slovak Cabinet.

FEAR OF U.S. INFLUENCE. The political turmoil in Eastern Europe is unquestionably aggravated by economic difficulties. Even moderate leaders in the countries of that area recognize that, under existing circumstances, their countries must follow a friendly policy toward Russia. But it is clear that Russia, itself devastated by war and in dire need of tools, machinery and many raw materials, will not be in a position at least for some time to come, to supply the reconstruction needs of its neighbors. On the contrary, Russia's own recovery program includes, among its cardinal assumptions, the possi-

bility of obtaining from these neighbors, whose economies in some cases—notably Czechoslovakia—are more advanced than its own, urgently required equipment, raw materials, and even food. Communist leaders in Eastern Europe are consequently finding it increasingly difficult to justify close economic ties with Russia, especially at a moment when the prospect of American aid to Europe is proving a powerful magnet for peoples ruined by war. The combined result of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall proposal, so far as Eastern Europe is concerned, has been to intensify the political struggle—a struggle which, it should be noted, is not merely between Right and Left, but also between those who favor the West and hope to get aid from that quarter, and those who favor Russia and hope to get aid from Moscow. The current drive to eliminate political opposition is thus also a drive to eliminate pro-American elements. The tragedy of Eastern Europe today, as was true of Russia in 1917, is that political development has not reached the stage where, as in Western Europe, a strong middle-of-the-road group can cushion the shock of clashing ideologies—and the alternative to extreme leftism appears to be extreme rightism. Under these conditions, such moderate elements as do exist in these countries, no matter how intelligent and courageous they may be, are constantly subject to erosion from either Right or Left.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

NIGERIAN NATIONALISM POSES MAJOR ISSUE FOR BRITAIN

Governor Sir John Macpherson and Chief Secretary H. M. Foot who are shortly to take over the administration of Nigeria, Britain's most important colony in area and population, will be confronted with one of the most difficult and important problems in the colonial world today. For in spite of the comprehensive colonial development program launched by London during the war, relations between the British and the educated native leaders of southern Nigeria have seriously deteriorated. This situation has caused great anxiety in the British government at a time when the present world economic and political crisis has given West Africa, along with many other dependent areas, a new strategic and commercial importance. Hoping to regain the confidence of Nigerians, the Colonial Office has inaugurated an extensive public relations program, and has appointed new British officials to the three top-ranking posts in the Nigerian government.

NIGERIAN POLITICAL CRISIS. Britain has an opportunity for success in recreating a friendly political atmosphere if the new Governor and Chief Secretary employ the proper psychological approach to the Nigerian people, and if they take steps to bring a larger number of educated Africans into the management of their own affairs. This oppor-

tunity is much enhanced by an internal political crisis which has developed among Nigerian nationalists during the past few weeks. When Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe returned empty handed from London on October 8 he found a rebellion brewing against his leadership of the Nigerian nationalist movement. Zik, as Azikiwe is known throughout West Africa, believes in the use of extremist tactics in political warfare. In London, where he has just headed a seven-member delegation from the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), Zik demanded that changes be made in the constitution granted by Britain only last year. His failure to win concessions has encouraged the moderates among his followers to repudiate his leadership. Concessions to Nigeria by Britain at this time would therefore strengthen the moderates and might bring about a considerable change in the Nigerian political atmosphere over the next few years.

IBOS VERSUS YORUBAS. The split between extremists and moderates would not be so important were it not for the growing hostility between the Ibos and Yorubas who, along with the Hausas, are the leading peoples of Nigeria. The Zikist movement derives its chief strength from the Ibos of the Eastern Provinces, Zik's homeland. The Hausas

of the Northern Provinces are Moslem in religion and are usually indifferent or hostile to Zikism. Among the Yorubas of the Western Provinces, Zik in the past has had a substantial following, but the present moderate rebellion against extremist leadership is also a Yoruba revolt against Ibo domination of the Nigerian nationalist movement.

The Ibos are Nigeria's most aggressive and individualistic people. They are less subject to the discipline of tribal authoritarianism than the Hausas or Yorubas, for they tend to live in small village units where there are no great chiefs like those of the North and West. Moreover, the density of population in the Eastern Provinces has induced many Ibos to migrate into Yoruba or Hausa country where this infiltration has aroused some hostility among the indigenous peoples. Yoruba leaders who oppose the Zikist policy of non-cooperation with the British government therefore believe that they can carry the Yoruba people with them. Zikists contend, on the contrary, that these Yoruba leaders are corrupt and uninfluential.

WILL NCNC BREAK UP? Whatever the truth of these charges and counter-charges, it is a fact that hisses were mingled with the cheers which greeted Zik when, upon his return from London, he reported to an NCNC general meeting the disappointing results of the NCNC delegation's trip to London, financed by more than £13,000 collected from the Nigerian people. Sharp clashes occurred moreover not only within the seven-member delegation in London, but also in Lagos NCNC circles on the eve of the delegation's return. The NCNC is not a political party but a coalition of nationalist groups formed in 1944. Its General Assembly has a large representation from the Zikist Movement,

but its twelve-member Working Committee, or executive body, has a strong Yoruba element. The Lagos political battle took the form of an Ibo attempt to purge the Working Committee of this Yoruba leadership. As a result of this pressure, three members of the Working Committee did submit their resignations, thereby bringing closer the danger of an Ibo-Yoruba split. Apparently because of this threat, and because Zik was still not home to meet it, many Ibos in the General Assembly reversed their previous vote, and refused to accept the resignations. This was the situation confronting Zik when he arrived in Lagos on October 8.

What are the implications of this crisis in Nigerian politics? Many signs point toward a more moderate course for Nigerian nationalism, providing Britain proceeds rapidly enough to carry out its policy of granting self-government to Nigeria at the earliest possible moment. Many Nigerian nationalists are firmly convinced that the colony's internal problems are so vast that its best chance for progress toward self-government lies in cooperating with Britain. One of Britain's greatest handicaps, however, is the fact that a considerable number of colonial officials cling to the view that the African is stupid, lazy and dishonest, and will not be ready for self-government for two hundred years. One such official can undermine the work of many enlightened administrators. That the Colonial Office is fully aware of this psychological problem is shown by its new emphasis on a program to promote better relations between British officials and the Nigerian people.

VERNON MCKAY

(Mr. McKay has just returned from West Africa where, under a research grant from the Carnegie Corporation, he studied conditions in the British colonies.)

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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated.

By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of September, 1947.

[Seal] CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public.
New York County, New York, County Clerk's No. 123, New York County
Reg. No. 164-M-9. (My commission expires March 30, 1949.)

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State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Vera Micheles Dean, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the Editor of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations), printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

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
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Washington News Letter



STATE DEPARTMENT STUDIES PROBLEMS RAISED BY LOYALTY TESTS

If Congress approves Secretary of State Marshall's proposals for European reconstruction, the administration of the program will call for a large staff. The need for competent personnel raises serious questions about the practical value, in their present form, of the loyalty investigations to which the Federal government in general, and the State Department in particular, subjects all candidates for employment. This kind of inquiry delayed the launching of the aid to Greece program last summer after Congress had appropriated funds to conduct it, because the Federal Bureau of Investigation found that it took a long time to clear the names of those whom the State Department wished to assign to Athens. Moreover, the atmosphere of mistrust generated in Washington by the "loyalty test" requirement has apparently caused at least a few competent persons to refuse to accept government posts. Careful study of the whole problem of determining the nature of "loyalty" might bring about the elimination of practices that now seem actually to impede recruitment.

DEFINITION AND DUE PROCESS. The emergence of the Soviet Union as the major rival of the United States in world affairs gives the issue of "loyalty" a critical character. Belief that American Communists are inevitably agents of the Soviet government impelled Congress to enact the present loyalty test statutes, which aim primarily at expelling Communists and those who sympathize with Communist ideas from public office. It is clearly the duty of government to defend itself from spies or saboteurs actuated by some ideological motive, but the current effort to root out the disloyal has confronted the Truman administration and Congress with a dilemma. Washington officials are caught between their desire to preserve the security of the state and the historic concern of Americans for the liberties of the citizen.

Examining this dilemma, the President's Committee on Civil Rights reported on October 29 that the loyalty tests present "two possible dangers." "In the first place, the standards by which the loyalty of an individual or an organization are to be determined may not be clearly defined. . . . A second danger is that the procedure by which the loyalty of accused federal employes is determined may not accord with our traditions of due process of law." The Federal government today does not clearly define loyalty, and it has dismissed employes with only superficial regard for the procedures which the

President's committee listed as vital to due process—"the right to a bill of particular accusations, the right to subpoena witnesses and documents where genuine security considerations permit, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to a stenographic report of proceedings, the right to a written decision, and the right of appeal." In neglecting to write precise definitions and in making inadequate provision for due process, it is possible that the State Department and other agencies have been dismissing innocent persons in the effort to rid the government of the truly disloyal.

STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAM. Aware of the dilemma inherent in the loyalty program, the State Department announced on October 7 that before any employe regarded as a "security risk" is "summarily dismissed," as required by the 1948 Appropriation Act, "he shall be granted a hearing before the Personnel Board." In June the department had dismissed ten "risks" without a real hearing. But even now the department, "for security purposes," forbids disclosure to the accused, at the hearing or any other time, of the evidence on which the charges against him rest. Administrative officers may interpret evidence in a manner that a jury would reject. In 1945 the State Department suspended a foreign service officer and one lesser official on grounds that they gave confidential information to "unauthorized persons," and a grand jury refused to indict them. After an exchange of correspondence with attorneys, the department on October 3 obliquely cleared of wrongdoing three of the ten whom four months earlier it had branded without qualification as "risks."

The possibility that such unfounded accusations will recur makes Federal office unattractive. Dismissal as a "risk" jeopardizes the reputations and severely limits the job opportunities open to those who are dropped. Establishment of machinery for publicly demonstrating the truth or falsity of disloyalty charges would meet the complaint that the Federal government follows star-chamber procedures. "We are aware," said the President's committee "that there are certain governmental agencies which . . . must have absolute assurance of the complete loyalty of all their employes. Yet our whole civil liberties history provides us with a clear warning against the possible misuse of loyalty checks to inhibit freedom of opinion and expression."

BLAIR BOLLES